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ESSAY
VIEWPOINTS FROM OLYMPUS
Kent Greenawalt*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Essay examines the Supreme Court's treatment of content and
viewpoint discrimination in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University
of Virginia.1 In that opinion, the Court adopted a very expansive
approach to what constitutes viewpoint discrimination, the form of content discrimination most disfavored by the Constitution. The Court held
that a public university could not decline to fund publication of Wide
Awake, a magazine devoted to proselytizing for Christianity, if it funded
other student publications.2 Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court accepted the argument of the sponsors of Wide Awake that the University
had engaged in viewpoint discrimination that was presumptively impermissible under the Free Speech Clause. It rejected the University's contention that the discrimination was supported by a compelling interest in
avoiding a violation of the Establishment Clause. 3 I here concentrate on
the free speech problem, and in particular on the Court's conclusion that
the University's categorization involved viewpoint discrimination. Since
no one denied that the University was engaged in some form of content
discrimination, whether or not it amounted to viewpoint discrimination
may seem to be a picky technicality; that characterization had practical
importance for the case, however, and may carry significant implications
for the future of First Amendment law.
The core of the Court's opinion is unconvincing because it fails to
elaborate a plausible account of what constitutes viewpoint discrimination. The implausibility of the Court's reasoning is apparent on the opinion's face and is decisively demonstrated by Justice Souter's dissent.4 Yet,
the Court's result might be based on two different conceptualizations of
* University Professor, Columbia University School of Law. I am very grateful for

helpful suggestions from Vince Blasi, Michael Doff, Geoffrey Stone, and my wife Elaine,
and for the able research assistance of Mark HulberL
1. 115 S.Ct. 2510 (1995).
2. See id. at 2519.
3. See id. at 2523-24. For a fuller treatment of the Establishment Clause issues, see
Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion
Clause, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. (forthcoming 1996).
4. Justice Souter believed that there was no viewpoint discrimination in the
University's denial of funding to Wide Awvake. Because the Guidelines limited not only
Christian advocacy, but also Muslim, Jewish, and even agnostic and atheist advocacy, they
did not skew debate by funding one position but not its competitors; rather, the Guidelines
denied "funding for the entire subject matter of religious apologetics." Rosenberger, 115 S.
Ct. at 2549 (SouterJ., dissenting).
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the danger posed to free speech by this type of regulation. Both these
conceptualizations-one resting on a more complicated analysis of the
state's categorization, the other simply concluding that the distinctions
drawn were unreasonable-are supported by material in the opinion. I
inquire whether these alternative conceptualizations afford a desirable
rendering of First Amendment principles and, more particularly, an
appropriate understanding of the limitations on religious speech.
II.

ViEWi'orNT

DISCRIMINATION AND ROSENBERGER

In the last two decades, the principle that content discrimination is
impermissible has emerged as a central feature of First Amendment jurisprudence.5 The basic idea is that although the government may restrict
speech for reasons unrelated to its message, it should not decide that
some messages are superior to others. The Supreme Court has indicated
that viewpoint discrimination, i.e., allowing speech that adopts one point
of view while prohibiting speech that takes a contrary position, is particularly hard to justify because it poses the greatest danger to liberty of expression. 6 Until recently, opinions have failed to notice that criminal
codes and tort law are riddled with distinctions that involve kinds of viewpoint distinctions-for example, you are free to say that Henry is a decent, honest man although you know he is a crook; you are not free to say
that he is a crook although you know he is a decent man. But these
marginal forms of viewpoint discrimination do not deflect from the
Court's fundamental principle that, across a wide range of subject matters, viewpoint discrimination is especially objectionable.
In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia used money from a compulsory student activity fund to pay for student publications of news, information, and opinion, but a University Guideline precluded payment for
any religious activity, defined as any activity that" 'primarily promotes or
manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.'
The editors of Wide Awake: A ChristianPerspective at the University of
Virginia had a self-expressed two-fold mission: "'to challenge Christians
to live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to
encourage students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus
Christ means.' " The legal controversy arose when WideAwake requested
money from the activity fund to pay its printing costs. The Appropria",'

5. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
Win. & Mary L. Rev. 189, 196 (1983) (noting that the Court has invalidated "almost every
content-based restriction that it has considered in the past quarter-century").
6. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992) ("restrictions based on
viewpoint are ... particularly pernicious"); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("viewpoint discrimination is
censorship in its purest form"); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785
(1978) ("power in government to channel the expression of views is unacceptable under
the First Amendment").
7. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2515 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 66a).
8. Id. (quoting Appendix at 45).
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tions Committee of the Student Council denied the request on the
grounds that Wide Awake was a religious activity within the meaning of the
Guideline. The editors then filed suit in federal court, alleging that the
University's refusal to pay violated their rights to freedom of speech and
press. 9
The Court initially determined that the University, by establishing
the activity fund and paying for student publications, had created a "limited public forum."' 0 Fifteen different student groups were funded as
"'student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or academic communications media groups.'-1 Funding decisions were to be administered "'in a manner consistent with the educational purpose of the University.' "12 Some matters that some groups of students might want to
publish would not be funded. The Guidelines excluded funding of electioneering and lobbying; and, presumably, advertisements for commercial products or sexually explicit material that falls just short of being
illegal obscenity would fail to qualify. Thus, the Guidelines embody what
is assumed to be some permissible content discrimination by the University. Both the majority and dissent assert that it matters whether the restriction on spending for religious activity amounts to viewpoint discrimination, a subcategory of content discrimination. Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the Court suggests that in this context, content discrimination that is not viewpoint discrimination could be supported by a weaker
justification than that necessary for viewpoint discrimination, an "egregious form of content discrimination."' 3 (On the significance of this difference, Justice Souter concurs.)' 4 Relying on past cases, Justice Kennedy
says that content discrimination that was not viewpoint discrimination
would be acceptable in a limited public forum if it was "'reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum.' "15 Thus, it is the Court's determination that viewpoint discrimination is involved that triggers a compelling interest test, under which, it turns out, the University's restriction
could be approved only if funding religious activities would violate the
Establishment Clause.
9. See id. at 2515-16.

10. See id. at 2517. The Supreme Court has distinguished among traditional public
fora, limited public fora, which are opened up by the government for specific purposes,
and all remaining public property. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992). The types of regulation that are

permissible depend on what kind of forum is in question. Although there are serious
questions about the usefulness of making so much turn on the nature of the forum, those
issues are beyond the scope of this Essay.
11. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2515.
12. Id. at 2514 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 61a).
13. Id. at 2516.
'14. See id. at 2548 (Souter, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 2517 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 804-06 (1985)).
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Justice Kennedy's analysis of viewpoint discrimination relies substantially on Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,16 in
which a unanimous Court held that a school district that opened its facilities to community groups could not bar a film series addressing child
rearing questions from a "Christian perspective" on the grounds that the
presentation would have communicated a religious perspective. The
Lamb's Chapel opinion characterized the school district's policy as discrim7
ination "on the basis of viewpoint."'
Acknowledging that the distinction between viewpoint discrimination and other content discrimination "is not a precise one," the
Rosenberger Court then enters the apparent heart of its argument:
By the very terms of the SAF prohibition, the University does not
exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored
treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious
editorial viewpoints. Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but
it also provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a
standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed
and considered. The prohibited perspective, not the general
subject matter, resulted in the refusal to make ...

payments.1 8

This appears to be the core of Kennedy's reasoning, as the next paragraph goes on to answer the "dissent's assertion" that no viewpoint discrimination occurred, 19 and the opinion nowhere hints that a differently
formulated guideline that excluded claims about religious truth might be
other than viewpoint discrimination.
In order to understand what divides the majority and dissent, we
need to consider forms of content distinction more precisely, to distinguish ways in which religion figures in discourse, and to attend to the
language of the critical Guideline.
III. FoRMs

OF CONTENT DISTINCrION AND LIMITED PUBLIC

FoRA

As opposed to a content-neutral restriction of expression, such as a
rule limiting the decibels of sound trucks, a content distinction makes
treatment of a communication depend upon its content. There are various kinds of content distinctions. Communications might be excluded
from a particular forum because of (1) their author, 20 (2) their overall
objectives (as advertising differs from other speech), (3) their form of
presentation (as sexually explicit speech differs from other presentations
of similar ideas), (4) their subject matter (as political advocacy differs
16. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
17. Id. at 2147.
18. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517.
19. See id. at 2518.
20. In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1983), a
union competing with the elected union representative was denied access to the
interschool mail system. (It is arguable whether discrimination solely in terms of authors is
really a form of content discrimination. It is also possible that, in certain circumstances,
author discrimination might actually amount to viewpoint discrimination.)
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from physics), and (5) their points of view (as advocacy of socialism dif-

fers from advocacy of capitalism). No doubt, these different kinds of distinctions shade into each other; one might, for example, claim that
speech that is not sexually explicit can never convey quite the same ideas
as sexually explicit speech.
My concern here is not to defend all of this categorization, but to
show that the meaning of "viewpoint" is ambiguous in this context, and to
address the relevance of this ambiguity to the regulation of expression in
a limited public forum. 2 1 Most importantly, both categories four and five
of "content distinctions" could also be seen as "viewpoint distinctions."
One might say that a distinction between political advocacy and physics is
one of viewpoint; speech with a scientific viewpoint is treated differently
from speech with a political viewpoint. But this is not viewpoint discrimination in the sense of favoring one competing point of view over another.
In Boos v. Barry, a law forbade displaying signs near embassies that
22
brought those governments into "public odium" or "public disrepute."
Messages favoring the foreign governments were allowed; those attacking
them were not. This was viewpoint discrimination in the narrow sense
and the law was held invalid because it was not sufficiently narrowly tailored. 23 This is the sense of viewpoint discrimination that both opinions
in Rosenberger employ. Justice Kennedy cites some cases that involve subject matter discrimination as if they do not involve viewpoint discrimination;24 and, after calling viewpoint discrimination an egregious form of
content discrimination, he writes, "The government must abstain from
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion
25
or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction."
Why does all this matter for a "limited public forum"? In a limited
public forum, the government has not opened up a space for all kinds of
speech. It maintains control to assure that speech fits reasonably with the
purpose of the forum.2 6 In the context of Rosenberger, all the Justices assume that the University may make decisions about content reasonably
related to the purposes of funding student publications, so long as it
avoids viewpoint discrimination.
Thus, returning to my categorization, many distinctions of the types
in categories one through four would be permitted as reasonable restric21. Stone, supra note 5, at 198-200, employs a broader sense of viewpoint than I
propose here, but his article preceded cases in which the Supreme Court has focused on
the narrower sense.
22. 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988).
23. See id. at 329.
24. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S.Ct.
2510, 2516 (1995) (citing, inter alia, Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972);
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991)
(involving discrimination by author and subject matter)).
25. Rosenberger 115 S.Ct. at 2516.
26. I pass over here some serious questions about the usefulness of analysis in terms of
distinct categories of fora.
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tions under the Court's analysis. The type of distinction in category five
distinguishes between points of view-particularly competing points of
view-and is, therefore, subject to a compelling state interest test.
IV.

RFLiGIous PERSPECrrvES

To understand the implications of this analysis for religious expression in a limited public forum, we must look at how we think religious
expression differs from other expression. What people in Western countries tend to think of as religious writings consists largely of "truth claims"
about religious matters-propositional claims, such as "there is a single
God" and "Jesus Christ came to save humankind," and accounts of personal experiences and responses to prayer, presented as reflective of genuine religious insight. Religious writings often also include urging, advice, admonitions to maintain or adopt a particular religious way of life.
Much writing about religion is not of this sort; it approaches religious
subjects from the descriptive perspective of some discipline such as history, anthropology, sociology, psychology, etc. Other writing relates core
religious views to positions on particular subjects, such as welfare, sexual
behavior, abortion, and capital punishment. Such writing can be mainly
descriptive, as when a political scientist explains the Roman Catholic position on abortion. There is also substantial normative commentary, as
when a writer arguesfora position on abortion from the perspective of the
Roman Catholic religion. The movies on child rearing in Lamb's Chapel
27
were of this variety.
Needless to say, these forms of discourse are often mixed in particular pieces of writing. For example, descriptive writing about religion may
include comment on the validity of truth claims; normative writing about
narrow subjects like abortion often involves urging to adopt (not only a
position about abortion but also) the overall religious perspective that
underlies the position. This latter mixture was often present in the articles of Wide Awake devoted to controversial social issues.28 Any ban on
religious expression might or might not include a ban on negative (atheist) claims about religious truth and (agnostic) claims of unknowability.
V.

INTERPRETING THE GUIDELINE

Let us now look at the crucial Guideline. It made ineligible for funding "any activity that 'primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.' ",29 The Guideline had
nothing to do with any descriptive writing about religion that refrains
from truth claims in the domain of religion. It covered explicitly atheist
27. See Lambs Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 118 S.Ct. 2141
(1993).
28. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
29. Id. at 2515 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 66a).
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or agnostic positions, as Justice Souter notes.3 0 Given the words
"promotes or manifests," the Guideline plainly covered both most religious truth claims (though not religious truth claims, if there are any,
that are detached from positions about a deity or ultimate reality) and
advice about a religious life that is tied to such claims.

Is normative writing on social issues from a religious perspective also
covered by the Guideline? Here much depends on the force of
"manifests" and "primarily." "Manifests" may function in the Guideline as
a limited supplement to "promotes." Suppose I write a long article showing the truth of atheism or agnosticism. In the last sentence I add, "Of
course, many people may benefit from believing religious illusions, and I
have no wish to change their minds." In one sense, I am not promoting
atheism or agnosticism. I am simply stating the truth as I understand it.
My article definitely "manifests" a belief about a deity and ultimate reality.
"Manifests" could, instead, have a much broader content. One might argue that any article about abortion that draws from Roman Catholic
premises "manifests" the views about a deity and ultimate reality of
Roman Catholicism, although these are rarely (or never) mentioned.
This brings us to "primarily." Of course, any explicit statement embracing fundamental religious premises will promote or manifest a view of the
kind the Guideline covers, but ordinarily that will be a small part of an
article on abortion or capital punishment. Suppose the main discussion
develops an argument about the permissibility of abortion whose overall
content reflects ("manifests" in the broader sense) the Roman Catholic
view. On this understanding, the whole article "manifests" a view covered
by the Guideline, but the main focus of the article is the more limited
subject of abortion. The point is arguable, but probably such an article
does not "primarily" manifest a view about the deity, although it consistently does so. This subtle point turns out to be crucial for our inquiry,
because the contrary position is actually necessary to render plausible the
position that the Guideline's main distinction was a form of viewpoint
discrimination.
Why is this so? The Guideline covers claims about religious truth
and related admonitions to live in accord with that truth. Because it covers all positive religious claims, atheist claims, and agnostic claims, it does
not prefer any one position over others. Of course, descriptive writing
about religion from a historical or psychological perspective is permitted,
so long as it does not take a position about religious truth. But that is
hardly relevant to viewpoint discrimination (in the narrow sense). Viewpoint discrimination has, up until Rosenberger, been conceived as favoring
one position over opposing positions. An historical account of the
development of Christianity or a psychological account of what draws
people to religion does not (or need not) take a position on religious
truth. It does not, therefore, oppose positions that advance truth claims
30. See id. at 2549 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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about religion. As to those, the University did not discriminate; it refused
to fund them all. Thus, viewpoint discrimination is not involved just because religion may be discussed from other perspectives. In regulation of
commercial advertising, discussion of the very same products, say by Consumer Reports, is not covered. Content discrimination may avoid being
viewpoint discrimination without addressing an entire subject matter
from every perspective.
I can see three possible objections to the position I have taken so far,
two of which have some merit. The first objection is that historical and
psychological accounts of religion may make explicit or implicit asserdons about religious truth. The Guideline allowed funding of those writings, because they are not primarily about religious truth, but it did not
allow funding of direct discussions of religious truth. This assertion is
correct as far as it goes, but it does not, in itself, establish viewpoint discrimination, especially because the entire range of positions on religious
truth could be asserted in passing, or implied, in historical and
psychological writings.
Yet there are two deeper concerns. One is that if all writings other
than religious writings are funded, religion may seem less important than
it otherwise would. Second, it is not merely that religious questions might
seem less important; some answers may be indirectly favored. If one conceives of oneself in a world in which religious questions do not seem important, atheism, and especially agnosticism, may feel like more appropriate positions than they would if religious questions were taken as of
dominant significance. Further, it may be true (at least at certain stages
of cultural history) that a high percentage of those who are inclined to
write about religion from perspectives of social science are skeptical
about positive religious truth claims. What their treatments loosely imply
or say in passing may in a high percentage of instances suggest negative
answers to religious questions such as whether God exists. Thus, we must
acknowledge that distinctions that do not themselves discriminate among
viewpoints may have the indirect causal effect of assisting the acceptance of
some viewpoints over others. One could plausibly argue that this is the
effect of the Guideline on religious truth claims.
In the paragraph that follows the one I have already mentioned, 3 '
Justice Kennedy suggests that the dissent:
reflects'an insupportable assumption that all debate is bipolar
and that anti-religious speech is the only response to religious
speech.... If the topic of debate is, for example, racism, then
exclusion of several views on that problem is just as offensive to
the First Amendment as exclusion of only one. It is as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and an atheistic perspective on

31. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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the debate as it is to exclude one, the
other, or yet another polit32
ical, economic, or social viewpoint.
If we concentrate on truth claims about religion, this passage is not telling, because claims across the wide spectrum were excluded by the
Guideline. If all assertions about whether racism is good or bad were
excluded, that also would not amount to viewpoint discrimination, even if
descriptive accounts of racism were permitted. Perhaps the key words in
the paragraph are "yet another political, economic, or social viewpoint."
Is the Court referring to descriptive accounts of various sorts or to normative positions? The previous paragraph talks of religion as providing a
perspective "from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered."33 If student publications employing a wide range of normative perspectives on, for example, a topic like abortion would be funded, but a
publication employing a religious perspective would not be funded, then
indeed we do have a form of viewpoint discrimination. An approach to
abortion that relies on the Bible and church statements is an alternative
to an approach that relies on nonreligious philosophy or a (normative)
economic analysis. On this front, Justice Kennedy has a valid position
34
about viewpoint discrimination, and it covers the facts of Lamb's Chapel.
But the conclusion about viewpoint discrimination remains flawed by serious, related difficulties.
The first difficulty is posed by the meaning of "manifests" and "primarily" in the Guideline. The opinion relies on the assumption that
"manifests" is not a limited supplement to "promotes"; rather a discussion
of a social problem manifests a belief in God if that is its underlying
premise. 35 The opinion does not face the problem posed by "primarily."-3 6 It is doubtful that the Guideline would (or should) have been
taken by University officials to exclude funding for a journal devoted to
pressing social issues that approached these issues from a particular religious perspective but neither developed in any detail truth claims about
God and ultimate reality nor urged people to accept such claims.
Justice Kennedy's second difficulty is that he seems unaware that his
valid conclusion about viewpoint discrimination covers only commentary
on social issues, not truth claims about religion and advice to live in accordance with these claims. (Only with regard to the former, but not the
latter, were some opposing positions favored over others.) One might
32. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510,

2518 (1995).
33. Id. at 2517.
34. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). The Court in Rosenberger disagrees with the dissent over
whether it mattered in Lambs Chapel that an atheist viewpoint on child-rearing could have
been presented. Compare Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518 with id. at 2550-51 (Souter, J.,

dissenting). Even if an atheist perspective had been excluded, allowing all perspectives on
child rearing besides religious and atheist ones would constitute viewpoint discrimination.

35. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2520.
36. Justice Souter writes that the Court "reads the word 'primarily'... right out of the
Guidelines." Id. at 2550 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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generously put this confusion aside as the product of compromise to
achieve a majority opinion or of the pressure of resolving cases at the end
of the term; but it turns out the matter is critical. If the Guideline constituted viewpoint discrimination only as to normative social commentary,
then perhaps the University could preclude funding for Wide Awake, or
other religious publications, under a reformulated Guideline. The Court
affords no intimation that this is possible. If the Justices are being candid, they suppose what they say about viewpoint discrimination covers the
entire range of discourse from religious perspectives. As we have seen,
that conclusion is fallacious, given an understanding of what viewpoint
discrimination is that fits the ordinary significance, and the Supreme
Court's own recent explication, of the term.
VI. A MoRE PLAusmBL RENDERING
The Court's opinion proceeds to say:
The first danger to liberty lies in granting the State the power to
examine publications to determine whether or not they are
based on some ultimate idea and if so for the State to classify
them. The second, and corollary, danger is to speech from the
37
chilling of individual thought and expression.
This comment, which echoes the tone of Justice Scalia's pervasive concern about uncertain lines and administrative discretion, is well taken,
but it has little to do with whether the line the Guideline drew was directly a form of viewpoint discrimination.
Kennedy's comment does suggest a basis for a plausible reformation
of the Court's own position, assuming that it definitely meant to bar any
classification in terms of religion. The basic theme would go something
like this:
When a classification that is formulated in terms of content but
not directly in terms of viewpoint is likely to have significant indirect effects that may favor some viewpoints over others and the
classification will require difficult and debatable administrative
judgments that themselves may be based on preference for
some viewpoints over others, the dangers to free expression
approach the magnitude of harm that occurs when outright
viewpoint discrimination is involved. Therefore, at least in circumstances of limited public fora, the degree ofjustification required to sustain such a classification will be the same as that
applicable to outright viewpoint discrimination.
The substance of this theme can easily be filled in with material from the
preceding discussion.
The Court's majority does have a solid argument that the Guideline's
classification was much more troublesome than standard subject matter
classification, and the troublesome features concerned the difficulty of
37. Id. at 2520.
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maintaining neutrality about competing positions in practice. Regrettably, the opinion in Rosenberger confuses, rather than clarifies, this point.
Even if one acknowledges all of the foregoing, it remains a genuine
issue whether an exclusion of the kind should be treated with the harshness of actual viewpoint discrimination. The majority at one point speaks
of the Guideline as "cast[ing] disapproval on particular viewpoints;"3 8 but
that remark is certainly misleading in the context of this case. The
nonfunding of religious truth claims is reasonably seen as a consequence
of a view that government should steer clear of religion, not a result of
the University's favoring some particular position on religion. In contrast
to typical viewpoint discrimination, the state was not endorsing one position in preference to another. That was a strong reason not to treat this
classification like outright viewpoint discrimination.
VII.

AN ALTERNATrVE

A sharper alternative to the Court's actual opinion would be to acknowledge that, at least in most of its coverage, the religious activity
Guideline does not involve either viewpoint discrimination or something
close enough to it to be treated similarly. The Court would then have
proceeded to see if the exclusion was reasonable in light of the purposes
for financing student publications. Given the Court's view that funding
would not violate the Establishment Clause, it might have decided that
such a drastic restriction about a subject matter of fundamental human
concern was not warranted. Yet, justifying the result under this approach
would be difficult since, if the controlling test was reasonableness, the
University could reasonably decide that sensitivity to the values of "no
establishment" should permit it to steer clear of financing religious
claims.
VIII.

BROADER IMPLICA1IONS

A. Free Speech Law
Taken at face value, the Rosenberger majority does just what Justice
Souter suggests: it undermines the distinction between viewpoint discrimination and most other content distinctions.3 9 As I have already
pointed out, if the fact that descriptive treatments of a subject matter
from a historical or psychological perspective are left free by some regulation is sufficient to constitute viewpoint discrimination, then there has
not yet been (and probably never will be) an instance of content discrimination that is not viewpoint discrimination. Further, any content discrimination is likely to have some indirect effect of helping certain viewpoints
in preference to others. For instance, regulations of sexually explicit expression will indirectly favor some views about sexual practice though the
38. Id.

39. See id. at 2550 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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class regulated is not defined in terms of view; regulation of all commercial advertising will benefit some products in preference to others and
will have some effect on people's attitudes toward the value of commercial advertising. No restriction on expression (content based or not) will
be entirely free of influence on acceptance of viewpoint.
Were the majority's opinion taken at face value, the implications for
free speech law would be considerable. Any special treatment for viewpoint discrimination in the ordinary sense would disappear, since all content discrimination would be seriously disfavored. Even on my reformulated account, the influence of the case would be significant. Courts
would have to estimate likely effects on viewpoints when they deal with
content discrimination that is not directly in terms of viewpoint, and they
would also have to evaluate the difficulties of administrative decision
under relevant guidelines for individual choices. The result would be a
flexible constitutional standard that could hardly please the likes ofJustice Scalia.
B. Religion and the Schools
Another implication of the opinion will not surprise those who argued for the Court's conclusion about viewpoint discrimination. The division between the majority and dissent strikingly resembles the long running argument about religion in public schools.
The Supreme Court has said that public schools should not teach
truth claims about religion or promote religious practices. 40 Whatever
the full effect on what schools have done, they may teach history, anthropology, etc. in a way that includes treatment of religion. Public schools
also teach public values and some individual moral values; they do so
without providing a religious base. Some critics of "religion-free" schools
argue that the consequence is a religion of "secularism." At one level, the
criticism is misguided; schools are barred from teaching atheism and agnosticism as well as positive religious claims. But, along the lines of what I
have suggested, an influence on religious positions may occur, since the
schools teach implicitly that one can approach many issues in life without
reference to religion. (One should hesitate a long time, however, before
concluding that the overall effect, as compared to that of teaching religion in schools, is harmful to positive religious views. The United States
is far more religious as a country than are many countries in which
schools have taught religion as a matter of course.)
If we apply the RosenbergerCourt's mistaken analysis to this problem,
we would conclude that the state is engaging in viewpoint discrimination
40. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (families entrust public
schools with the education of their children "on the understanding that the classroom will
not purposely be used to advance religious views"); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (First Amendment "wall" between
church and state prevents use of public schools for "dissemination of religious doctrines").
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when teachers give advice about how to live without making truth claims
about religion. The Court met this problem in a way for most university
speech by indicating that when the University speaks for itself, as opposed
to opening a limited public forum, it may promote messages that it favors.4 1 What the Court does not say in this connection is that the
Establishment Clause, by every prevailing interpretation, bars the state
from directly promoting some religious views at the expense of others.
Thus, religious messages are a form of preferred view which the state university is not allowed.
The majority opinion leaves us with this dilemma. Keeping religion
out of the public schools constitutes viewpoint discrimination, but that
may still be preferable to having the state directly endorse religious positions. This way of conceptualizing matters may not yield a significant alteration of the fundamental principle that public schools should avoid
teaching the truth of religious beliefs.. But we can imagine that this understanding might affect positions about more peripheral contacts of students with religion in public schools and positions regarding the need for
private religious schools for families whose views the public schools do
not reflect. The muddled analysis of the Rosenberger Court offers rhetorical ammunition to advocates of more accommodation to religion in
public school programs and of public funding of private religious
schools. That is regrettable, whether or not it entered the conscious
awareness of the majority Justices.

41. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct.
2510, 2518 (1995).

